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Federal Taxation
by Robert Beard*
This Article surveys notable decisions in federal taxation handed down
in 2012 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and lower courts appealable to the Eleventh Circuit.1 This year, the
Eleventh Circuit considered questions relating to securities transactions
and the statute of limitations on assessment of taxes, while the Tax
Court applied the step-transaction doctrine to a capital contribution to
a corporation.
I. CALLOWAY V. COMMISSIONER
Calloway v. Commissioner2 addressed one of a number of similar stock
loan transactions promoted by a company called Derivium, which was
later targeted by the Department of Justice as a tax shelter promoter
and sued by a number of investors for fraudulent conduct. The Calloway
transaction took the following form. The taxpayer held an appreciated
position in IBM stock. In 2001, Derivium agreed to lend Calloway
ninety percent of the market value of the stock. The loan was nonrecourse and secured by the stock, which was transferred into a
Derivium account. Under the parties' agreement, Derivium had full
control over the collateral stock, including the power to sell it without
notice. The loan had a three-year term, could not be prepaid, and bore
interest at a 10.5 percent annual rate, which was not paid currently. At
the end of the loan term, the borrower would have the option to
surrender the collateral or repay the loan principal and accrued interest
to have the collateral stock returned.3 Though Derivium represented to

* Associate in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
2004); Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2007); University of Florida, Frederic G.
Levin College of Law (L.L.M., 2011). Member, State Bars of Ohio and Georgia.
1. For an analysis of federal taxation decided during the prior survey period, see Robert
Beard, Federal Taxation, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 63 MERCER L. REV. 1267 (2012).
2.

691 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).

3.

Calloway v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 26, 28-29 (2010).
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investors that it would hold the collateral stock for safekeeping and
hedge its risk using a proprietary strategy, in fact, it immediately sold
the collateral.4 When the taxpayer's loan matured in 2004, Calloway
elected to surrender the collateral rather than repaying the loan.5
The taxpayer did not report the transaction consistently. No gain
from the sale of the stock was reported in 2001, but the taxpayer did not
report dividends during the loan period or any gain on his decision to
surrender the IBM stock in 2004. The Internal Revenue Service
(Service) determined that the Derivium agreement amounted to a sale
of the stock in 2001 and also imposed a penalty for failure to file a
return and for significant understatement of income.6
A.

Tax Court Opinion
The taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the
deficiency. The issue of whether a transaction represented a sale or a
loan of securities was an issue of first impression for the Tax Court.'
The majority opinion applied a multi-factor test' from Grodt & McKay
Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner.9 Grodt & McKay involved an investment
tax credit shelter in which an investor purported to purchase a herd of
cattle at a steeply inflated price, paid partly in cash and mostly in the
form of a non-recourse note. The cattle continued to be husbanded by
the seller. The terms of the sale minimized the investor's economic
exposure, but the investor nonetheless claimed a large investment tax
credit based on the inflated "purchase" price.'0 In determining that the
purported sale was a sham, the court in Grodt & McKay provided a list
of factors characterizing a sale:
(1) Whether legal title passes;
(2) how the parties treat the transaction;
(3) whether an equity was acquired in the property;

(4) whether the contract creates a present obligation on the seller to
execute and deliver a deed and a present obligation on the purchaser

to make payments;
(5) whether the right of possession is vested in the purchaser;

4. Id. at 34. When Derivium loans began to mature and some borrowers repaid their
loans and demanded return of their collateral, Derivium was unable to perform, giving rise
to a number of lawsuits. See id. at 34-35.
5. Calloway, 691 F.3d at 1317-19.
6. Id. at 1319.
7. Calloway, 135 T.C. at 32-33.
8. Id. at 33-34.
9. 77 T.C. 1221 (1981).
10. See id. at 1222-23, 1234-35.
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(6) which party pays the property taxes;
(7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and
(8) which party receives the profits from the operation and sale of the
property.'
Applying the Grodt & McKay factors, the Tax Court concluded the
taxpayer had sold his IBM stock to Derivium in 2001.12 The court
concluded that each factor except the sixth, dealing with property taxes,
suggested a sale, not a loan. 3 The court stressed Derivium's receipt of
unqualified possession and control of the property and concluded that
the taxpayer "retained no property interest in the stock. At best he had
an option to purchase an equivalent number of IBM shares after 3 years
,"14

The majority's reliance on the Grodt & McKay factors was criticized
by two concurring opinions, both of which argued that Grodt & McKay,
which addressed an alleged sale of tangible property, was a poor guide
to transactions in financial instruments. 5 Judge Halpern filed a
concurring opinion arguing the majority's reasoning was needlessly
complex.'" Halpern argued that tax ownership of securities is determined solely by the putative new owner's degree of control over the
securities. 7 If the borrower had complete control over the securities,
as Derivium did, then it should be treated as the tax owner, regardless
of its degree of economic ownership. 8
The second concurring opinion also sought a simpler basis for the
court's decision. Judge Holmes argued that, even if the transaction was
respected as a secured loan, general tax principles would require
Calloway to recognize gain at the time the collateral was sold by
Derivium."9 Since the collateral was sold immediately, the tax results
would be substantially the same as if the stock loan to Derivium were
treated as a sale event.20

11. Id. at 1237 (internal citations omitted).
12. Calloway, 135 T.C. at 34.
13. Id. at 34-36.
14. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 49-50 (Halpern, J., concurring), 54-55 (Holmes, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 49 (Halpern, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 50-51 (Halpern, J., concurring). Judge Halpern cited Provost v. UnitedStates,
269 U.S. 443 (1926), and Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365 (1908), which established
possession and the right to sell as the two keys to establishing tax ownership of stock.
18. Calloway, 135 T.C. at 51 (Halpern, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 53 (Holmes, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 69.
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B.

Eleventh Circuit Opinion
The narrow legal question posed by Calloway is of relatively little
interest. It was clear to most observers that the Derivium tax shelter,
as structured, did not work to defer gain on appreciated securities.2'
The more significant element of the decision is how that conclusion
should be reached. The opinions in the Tax Court presented three
alternative grounds.22 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
accepted the majority's Grodt & McKay approach and rejected the two
concurring theories.23 However, the Eleventh Circuit also suggested
that the Grodt & McKay test should be viewed through the prism of
Dunne v. Commissioner,' a Tax Court case deciding which of two
shareholders of an S corporation should take the corporation's income
into account while ownership of the shares was under dispute.2 5
It is unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit is correct in viewing Dunne
as a helpful refinement of the Grodt & McKay factors. Neither of the
26
decisions in Dunne and Anschutz v. Commissioner, which recently
applied the Dunne factors to a deferred sale of stock, cited Grodt &
McKay. Moreover, both of those cases involved transactions where it
was conceded that a sale had occurred, and the only question was when
tax ownership was transferred.27
A problem with both the Grodt & McKay and Dunne tests is that,
despite offering lush lists of factors, they offer little actual guidance as
to how a transaction should be analyzed. This is in part because many
of the factors listed are irrelevant for most transactions. 2' A broader
concern is that simply listing potentially relevant factors does little to
illuminate how a court should weigh those factors. Obviously a
transaction where every relevant factor points to a sale is a sale, and one
where every factor indicates a loan is a loan. The interesting cases arise

21. See, e.g., Sam Young, Tax Court Reached Right Decision in Calloway Despite Weak
Reasoning,PractitionersSay, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 12, 2010), availableat LEXIS 2010
TNT 132-7.
22. See Calloway, 691 F.3d at 1327, 1332.
23. Id.
24. No. 24666-05, 2008 WL 656496 (T.C. Mar. 12, 2008).
25. Calloway, 691 F.3d at 1329.
26. 135 T.C. 78 (2010).
27. See Dunne, 2008 WL 656496, at *7; Anschutz, 135 T.C. at 98.
28. The Grodt & McKay factors include: property taxes; delivery of deeds; and risk of
damage to the property. 77 T.C. at 1237-38. The Dunne factors include: right to
participate in shareholder meetings; right to vote for directors; and right to inspect
corporate books. 2008 WL 656496, at *11. Though these rights may be germane in the
context of a close corporation, they have little relevance for most securities transactions.
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where the factors are mixed. If a securities transaction is formally a
sale, but the "seller" retains some exposure to the economics of the
security (or vice versa), how should the transaction be taxed? A simple
list stating that both the form and the economics are relevant does not
help resolve this question.
The decisions in both the Eleventh Circuit and the Tax Court
expressed a desire to avoid altering the treatment of common commercial
transactions."
Many legitimate transactions involve transferring
possession of, or an economic interest in, securities. Some such
transactions, like stock loans, have their treatment codified by statute.
The taxation of other transactions, such as repurchase agreements, is
surprisingly uncertain, despite their ubiquity. A broadly worded opinion
in Calloway could potentially have created uncertainty for such
transactions. Fortunately, though the Calloway opinion purports to
establish an explicit test for distinguishing sales from loans in the
securities context, the vagueness of the multi-factor test should prevent
the opinion from creating any real uncertainty for common transactions.
II.

SHOCKLEY V. COMMISSIONER

Shockley v. Commissioner" addressed the question of when proceedings relating to a defective notice of deficiency will toll the statute of
limitations. 31 The case arose from a tax deficiency asserted by the
Service with respect to Shockley Communications Corp. (SCC) and its
individual shareholders, Sandra and Terry Shockley, as transferees. In
2001, the Shockleys sold SCC, which was merged out of existence by the
buyer.32 The corporation filed a return for its short 2001 year in 2002.
The Service audited SCC's 2001 return. In 2004, the Service requested
an extension of the statute of limitations from the Shockleys, in their
capacity as officers of the corporation, but the Shockleys informed the
Service that they were no longer officers of SCC and identified the
successor-in-interest of SCC. 33

29. See Calloway, 691 F.3d at 1332; Calloway, 135 T.C. at 69 (Holmes, J., concurring).
30. 686 F.3d 1228 (llth Cir. 2012).
31. Id. at 1230.
32. Id. It appears the underlying transaction was a "Midco" transaction in which, as
part of a prearranged plan, the acquirer liquidated SCC and immediately sold a portion of
its assets to another party. Shockley v. Comm'r, No. 28210-08, 2011 WL 1641884, at *2
(T.C. May 2, 2011). The substance of the deficiency asserted by the Service was that SCC
recognized gain on the sale of its assets. Id. at *12. Midco transactions are listed
transactions. I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299.
33. Shockley, 686 F.3d at 1230.
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In 2005, the Service issued two notices of deficiency. One was mailed
to the address provided on SCC's return. The second was sent to the
Shockleys' personal address. Both listed SCC as the taxpayer. The
Shockleys filed a protective Tax Court petition with respect to the second
notice, asserting that the notice was invalid with respect to SCC. The
first notice, which was sent to the corporation's last known address, was
conceded to be valid. Likewise, the second notice, which was sent to the
address of the shareholders, was conceded to be invalid.34 The ultimate
issue was whether the petition filed with respect to the invalid notice
sufficed to extend the statute of limitations.3 5
A.

Background
Before a tax can be collected, it must be assessed.3" Before an income
tax can be assessed, the Service must issue a statutory notice of
deficiency.37 Once a notice of deficiency is issued, the taxpayer has
ninety days to file a petition in the Tax Court.3" The Service may
assess the tax after the ninety-day period passes or, if a petition is filed,
after the Tax Court's decision becomes final.39
For assessment of income taxes, the statute of limitations is typically
three years from the date of filing of the tax return (or, if later, the due
date for the return).4° The statute of limitations period is tolled during
the ninety-day period after the issuance of a statutory notice, during the
pendency of any Tax Court litigation, and for sixty days after the end of
those periods. 4'
Once a tax is assessed against a taxpayer, transferee liability can be
asserted against certain transferees. The Service has one year after the
limitations for the primary tax to issue
expiration of the statute of 42
notices of transferee liability.

SCC fied its 2001 return in February 2002. Thus, the three-year
statute of limitations would expire in February 2005. The Service
mailed two timely notices of deficiency. The notice of deficiency with
respect to SCC was uncontested, so absent the second notice, the statute
of limitations would have been extended by only 150 days, to July 2005.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at
Id. at
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

1230-35.
1230.
§ 6501(a) (2006).
§ 6213(a) (2006).

§ 6501(a).
§ 6503(a)(1) (2006).
§ 6901(c) (2006).
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Since the Service did not assess the tax during this period, the taxpayer
argued that the assessment was time-barred.43
However, Section 6503(aXl) of the Internal Revenue Code" provides
that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any
petition for a redetermination of the deficiency in the Tax Court.45
Thus, if the petition filed by the Shockleys is taken into account, the
statute of limitations would have been extended until the Shockleys'
petition was ultimately dismissed.4"
The Tax Court ruled in favor of the taxpayers.4 7 The court distinguished two earlier cases that held a petition filed by an individual who
lacked capacity to act on behalf of the taxpayer was still effective to toll
the statute of limitations.4" In the Tax Court's view, the critical
distinction was that the Shockleys' petition noted on its face that it
disputed the validity of the underlying notice of deficiency.49 Thus, it
was not reasonable for the Service to rely on the petition, as it would be
if the petition did not explicitly allege an underlying defect. 50
B.

Eleventh CircuitDecision
The Eleventh Circuit overturned the decision of the Tax Court and
held that the Service's assessment of the tax was timely. 1 Relying
primarily on the plain language of the statute, which was found to be
unambiguous,52 the court held that § 6503(a)(1) creates a "mechanical,

43.

Shockley, 2011 WL 1641884, at *2-3.

44. I.R.C. § 6503(aXl) (2006).
45. Id.
46. Shockley, 2011 WL 1641884, at *5.
47. Id. at *9.
48. Id. at *8-9.
49. Id. at *9.
50. Id. The Tax Court also cited Greve v.Commissioner,42 B.T.A. 142 (1940), in which
the Board of Tax Appeals held that an invalid notice which prompted the taxpayer to file
a petition did not result in a suspension of the statute of limitations. Id. at 145. However,
in Greve, the statute of limitations lapsed in the period between the mailing of the invalid
notice and the filing of the petition. Id. In Shockley, the statute was extended by the valid
notice sent to SCC. 2011 WL 1641884, at *6.
51. Shockley, 686 F.3d at 1239.
52. The court also attempted to draw a distinction between § 6503(a)(1), which tolls the
statute of limitations "if a proceeding in respect of the deficiency is placed on the docket
of the Tax Court," and § 6213, which allegedly "create[s] a specific statutory suspension
when the 'taxpayer' files a 'petition' for 'redetermination of the deficiency." I.R.C.
§ 6503(a)(1); Shockley, 686 F.3d at 1236. In the court's view, this distinction suggested that
§ 6503(a)(1) was intended to be broader than § 6213. Id. Leaving aside the question of
whether it is plausible to suggest that Congress intended to create subtle differences
between cases that restrict the Service's assessment of taxes and those that suspend the
statute of limitations, the court's comparison is factually incorrect. Section 6213(a)
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bright-line test."53 Any proceeding placed on the Tax Court docket
relating to a deficiency suspends the statute of limitations for assessment of that deficiency.5 4 Because the Shockleys' petition was filed in
response to a notice of deficiency that clearly described SCC's corporate
deficiency (even though it was mailed to the Shockleys as individuals),
it operated to toll the limitations period."
The court also disputed the Tax Court's conclusion that the Shockleys
did not purport to file their petition on behalf of SCC.5" The Eleventh
Circuit noted that SCC was listed on the petition as the petitioner, and
the petition stated that it was "filed on behalf of [SCCI subject to the
invalidity of the Notice of Deficiency and the failure to properly serve the
corporation."57 The court was also concerned that disregarding the
Shockleys' petition for statute of limitations purposes would create a
"Hobson's choice" for the Service when a petition challenging a notice of
deficiency was filed: either assess the tax, which would violate § 6213 if
the notice is upheld, or do nothing, and be unable to assess the tax later
if the notice is invalid. 58
The Eleventh Circuit's decision creates considerable uncertainty for
taxpayers who receive a notice of deficiency that may be invalid.
Litigating the deficiency on its merits is probably unwise. If the notice
turns out to be invalid, the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction, so any favorable
judgment cannot be relied on. Moreover, the litigation will extend the
Service's statute of limitations to issue a valid notice. Filing a protective
petition to challenge the validity of the notice is also problematic after
Shockley because it gives the Service more time to issue a new notice of
deficiency.59 The final option is to simply do nothing in response to the
notice. Though this option does not extend the statute of limitations for
the Service, if the notice is valid, taxpayers may have forfeited their only
opportunity to challenge the validity of the Service's determination
without paying the tax.

restricts assessment of a tax "if a petition has been filed with the Tax Court." I.R.C.
§ 6213(a). The more specific language cited by the court is used to explain that a taxpayer
may file a petition to request a redetermination of a deficiency.
53. Shockley, 686 F.3d at 1236.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1231.
58. Id. at 1236.
59. See id. (stating § 6503(a)(1) must be read in favor of the government and thus the
2005 petition suspended the statute of limitations).
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The opinion in Shockley has been criticized by some commentators. 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
affirmed the principle that a petition filed to contest an invalid notice
does not extend the statute of limitations.6 ' Moreover, the same
principle was adopted by the Service in Rev. Ruling 88-88.62 In that
ruling, the Service considered the consequences of mistakenly issuing a
notice of deficiency when the taxpayer had already fied a Tax Court
petition for that year.63 Such a notice is invalid, and, the Service
reasoned, "[blecause such a notice is invalid, the filing of a Tax Court
petition with respect to it does not stop the running of the period of
limitations under section 6503(a) of the Code within which the Service
may correct this error and summarily assess the tax.""
III.
A.

G.D. PARKER, INC. V. COMMISSIONER

Background

In G.D. Parker,Inc. v. Commissioner,5 the taxpayer (GDPI) was a
U.S. corporation owned by a Peruvian resident (G.D. Parker) through a
chain of foreign holding corporations. Through 2003, GDPI was in the
business of operating marinas through one of its consolidated subsidiaries. In 2003, the marina business was sold in an installment sale, with
the bulk of the consideration to be paid in 2004.66
The direct parent of GDPI was Vilanova, S.A., a Panamanian
corporation that also owned a two-percent stake in a Peruvian telecommunications company, Tele2000, S.A. Tele2000 was originally founded
by Parker, but the remaining ninety-eight percent of its shares had since
been acquired by BellSouth. Parker and BellSouth were engaged in
various lawsuits and disputes relating to the acquisition. By 2004,
Vilanova's basis in its Tele2000 stock exceeded its fair market value by
a factor of approximately 100.67
In March 2004, BellSouth signed an agreement to sell its Tele2000
stock to Telefonica, a Spanish media conglomerate. As part of the sale

60. See Andy R. Roberson & Kevin Spencer, 11th Circuit Allows Invalid Notice to
Suspend Assessment Period,TAX NoTEs ToDAY (Aug. 8, 2012), available at LEXIS 2012
TNT 153-3.
61. Napoliello v. Comm'r, 655 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011).
62. Rev. Rul. 88-88, 1988-2 C.B. 354.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. No. 20280-06L, 2012 WL 5935661 (Nov. 27, 2012).
66. Id. at *1, *3.
67. Id. at *4-5, *7.
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agreement, BellSouth indemnified Telefonica against the risk of having
to pay more than a stated amount to Vilanova to acquire the remaining
outstanding shares.6" A sale at the stated amount would produce a
capital loss to Vilanova.
The 2004 installment payment on GDPI's marina sale was expected
to produce considerable gain. To offset this gain, Vilanova contributed
its Tele2000 stock to GDPI in' September 2004, settled its various
disputes with BellSouth, and, in December, caused GDPI to sell the
Tele2000 stock to Telefonica at the requested price. The consideration
for the Tele2000 stock was paid directly to Parker. The Service
challenged GDPI's claimed capital loss. 69

B. Analysis
The particular tax avoidance transaction at issue in G.D. Parkeris no
longer viable because of Section 362(e) of the Internal Revenue Code,7 °
which requires a corporation "import[ing]" a built-in loss from a foreign
shareholder to write down its basis in the asset. 71 If § 362(e) applied,
GDPI's basis in the Tele2000 stock would have been reduced to fair
market value.72
Though the Service argued that § 362(e)-which was enacted shortly
before the transaction at issue-applied, the Tax Court's decision was
based on the step-transaction doctrine.73 The court applied the most
expansive formulation of the step-transaction doctrine: the end-result
test.74 Under this formulation, a court will disregard an intermediate
step in a transaction if the step is part of a single transaction intended
to achieve a particular end result.75 Once the decision was made to
apply the end-result test, the conclusion that the contribution of the
Tele2000 shares to GDPI should be disregarded was a foregone
conclusion. The taxpayer was unable to offer any serious business
reason for the contribution of the shares to GDPI.7 Given the close
proximity of the contribution of the shares and their sale, it was very
77
clear to the court that the sale was the intended end result.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at *8.
Id. at *3, *8.
I.R.C. § 362(e) (2006).
Id.
G.D. Parker,2012 WL 5935661, at *13.
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id.
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It is possible that a significant factor in the court's decision was the
fact that the sales price for the Tele2000 shares was paid directly to
Parker, not to GDPI, the normal seller. Given that the Tele2000 stock
was nearly worthless, the payment of the consideration would seem to
be relatively insignificant. The Tax Court's opinion does not give much
explicit weight to this factor. However, it is possible that the parties'
failure to respect this aspect of their desired form was fatal. As the
transaction actually happened, the taxpayer was arguing for a four-step
construction: (1) Vilanova contributes Tele2000 shares to GDPI; (2)
GDPI sells shares to BellSouth, recognizing a capital loss; (3) GDPI
distributes proceeds to Vilanova; and (4) Vilanova distributes proceeds
to Parker. By contrast, the Service's recast of the transaction only
involved two steps: (1) Vilanova sells the Tele2000 shares to BellSouth,
recognizing the loss; and (2) Vilanova distributes the proceeds to
Parker."8
As the transaction actually happened, the Service's recast is considerably more direct. Vilanova's contribution of shares and GDPI's
distribution of cash create a circular flow, making it relatively simple for
the Tax Court to collapse the two steps. On the other hand, if GDPI had
received and retained the proceeds, the taxpayer's view of the transaction would have two steps: (1) Vilanova contributes Tele2000 shares to
GDPI; and (2) GDPI sells shares to BellSouth, recognizing a capital loss.
The Service's desired recast would be no simpler: (1) Vilanova sells the
Tele2000 shares to BellSouth, recognizing the loss; and (2) Vilanova
contributes the proceeds to GDPI. In this hypothetical case, the Service
would be reordering steps, rather than collapsing multiple steps into
one. Some cases have refused to apply the step-transaction doctrine in
such situations.79
Even if the transaction had survived step-transaction scrutiny, the Tax
Court arguably should have disallowed GDPI's claimed loss under
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code 8° or the Court Holding
doctrine."' Section 482 permits the Commissioner to reallocate income
between entities under common control as needed to clearly reflect
income."2 The Court Holding doctrine developed at a time when
corporate liquidations followed by shareholder sales of assets were
treated more favorably than direct corporate sales. As a result, some

78. Id. at *21, *25.
79. See, e.g., Esmark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171 (1988).
80. I.R.C. § 482 (2006).
81. See Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). The Service advanced these
arguments in its notice of deficiency. G. D. Parker,2012 WL 5935661, at *9.
82. I.R.C. § 482.
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taxpayers would negotiate a sale at the corporate level, then purport to
liquidate the corporation and have the shareholders sell the assets. In
cases where the transaction was agreed in substance at the corporate
level, the Court Holding doctrine provided that the corporation should
be treated as the true seller, with the attendant tax consequences.
Under both § 482 and Court Holding, the contribution of the Tele2000
stock appears dubious. It appears that the relevant terms of the sale of
stock were agreed to before the stock was contributed to GDPI.

